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ABSTRACT 
This study attempts to analyze the effect of involvement in the selection of strategic initiatives 
and the strategic initiatives report on strategic initiatives and managerial performance evalua-
tion in the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) context. It is argued that managers’ involvement in the 
selection of strategic initiatives will increase the tendency to arrive at a conclusion that is con-
sistent with their preference especially when they receive complex information. In addition to 
it, strategic initiatives report is expected to reduce the effect of motivated reasoning by provid-
ing strong evidence on the initiative’s effectiveness. Using a 2×2 between subjects of experi-
ment involving 63 undergraduate students, it was found that the involvement of the managers 
has no significant effect on both the evaluation of strategic initiative effectiveness and division 
manager’s performance. Furthermore, it was also found that the strategic initiative report has 
only effect on division manager’s performance but at the unexpected direction. Finally, the 
study cannot provide evidence on the interaction effect of the two independent variables. 
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PENGARUH KETERLIBATAN DALAM PEMILIHAN DAN LAPORAN  
INISIATIF STRATEGIS TERHADAP EVALUASI INISIATIF STRATEGIS DAN 
KINERJA MANAJER DIVISI MENGGUNAKAN BALANCED SCORECARD 
ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini menganalisis pengaruh keterlibatan dalam seleksi inisiatif strategis dan lapo-
ran inisiatif strategis pada evaluasi kinerja manajer divisi menggunakan Balance scorcard 
(BSC). Dalam BSC, dinyatakan bahwa keterlibatan manajer dalam seleksi inisiatif strategis 
akan meningkatkan kecenderungan untuk kesimpulan yang konsisten dengan preferensi 
mereka khususnya ketika mereka menerima informasi yang kompleks. Di samping itu, inisi-
atif strategis juga diharapkan bisa mengurangi efek motivated reasoning dengan memberi-
kan bukti kuat pada efektivitas inisiatif. Dengan menggunakan 2×2 antara subjek eksperimen 
yang melibatkan 63 mahasiswa S1, ditemukan bahwa keterlibatan manajer tidak signifikan 
pada evaluasi efektivitas inisiatif maupun kinerja manajer divisi. Selanjutnya, juga ditemu-
kan bahwa laporan inisiatif strategis hanya berpengaruh pada kinerja manajer divisi tetapi 
pada arah yang tidak diharapkan. Akhirnya, penelitian ini belum bisa memberikan bukti em-
piris tentang efek interaksi dua variabel independen yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini. 
 
Kata Kunci: Balanced Scorecard (BSC), Strategic Initiatives, Involvement, Strategic Initiatives 
Report, Motivated Reasoning, Strategy Evaluation, Performance Evaluation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC), combining the 
measures of financial and non-financial per-
formance is believed to be able to translate 
corporate strategy into operational actions. 
Atkinson et al. (1997) suggest that the BSC 
has a great framework for analyzing the rela-
tionships among the components in the 
company’s system of management control. 
BSC which is dealt with strategies, proc-
esses, and managers in a single unit can pro-
vide integrated planning and control sys-
tems. 
Since initiated in 1992 by Kaplan and 
Norton, the BSC concept has developed the 
concept so far. BSC was originally intro-
duced as a performance measurement tool 
(Kaplan and Norton 1992). Furthermore, 
BSC evolved into a strategic management 
system (Kaplan and Norton 1996a, 1996b, 
2001). The development of the concept is 
heavily influenced by the development in the 
use of BSC in a variety of organizations, 
both business and non-business (Kaplan 
2009). 
BSC was found to have a positive effect 
on organizational performance (Hoque and 
James 2000), business unit (Davis and Al-
bright 2004), as well as the motivation of the 
individual (Burney and Swanson 2010). 
However, other researchers also found a 
negative impact on the company's imple-
mentation of BSC (Malina and Selto 2001; 
Ittner, Larcker and Randall 2003; Ittner, 
Larcker and Meyer 2003). Some factors hin-
dering the effectiveness of the BSC include 
the existence of one-way communication 
(Malina and Selto 2001), subjectivity in the 
evaluation (Ittner, Larcker and Meyer 2003), 
and cognitive limitations (Lipe and Salterio 
2000). 
For example, Tayler (2010) revealed the 
presence of bias in the use of BSC, espe-
cially when a supervisor evaluating the strat-
egy when there is the tendency by an indi-
vidual to conclude that BSC data is very 
complex according to their preferences (mo-
tivated reasoning). In his research, Tayler 
(2010) found that the top managers involved 
in the selection of a strategic initiative will 
assess such initiatives more successfully 
than those who are not involved. However, 
Tayler (2010) does not provide a solution of 
how to reduce the bias 
This is a follow-up research by Tayler 
(2010), attempts to reveal whether the feed-
back from strategic analysis of the correla-
tion between strategic initiatives and per-
formance measures of performance among 
the measures to reduce bias due to "moti-
vated reasoning". 
Kaplan and Norton (1996a) argue that 
providing feedback that gives a clear picture 
of the cause-effect relationship among the 
measures of performance will be very help-
ful in determining the validity of the as-
sumptions underlying the strategy of the or-
ganization. Managers are expected to be eas-
ier to confirm the effectiveness of the strat-
egy with the strategic feedback. 
This study is also expected to enrich the 
research on BSC considering research on 
BSC which is viewed more as a performance 
measurement tool and not as a strategic 
management tool. 
 The research is at the point of view of 
the process for developing the BSC where 
the selection process consists of strategic 
initiatives. It also analyses the influence of 
strategic feedback suggested by Kaplan and 
Norton (1996a) as a tool on strategic learn-
ing process of BSC. The next part of this 
research is a review of the literature and de-
velopment of hypotheses. This is then fol-
lowed by the research method, and the next 
section will show the results of research and 
discussion. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
Balanced Scorecard and Its Impact 
BSC was formerly introduced by Kaplan and 
Norton in 1992. It consists of financial per-
formance measures which are supplemented 
by operational measures consisting of the 
dimensions of the customer, internal busi-
ness processes and innovation and learning 
(Kaplan and Norton 1992). BSC general 
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framework consists of strategic objectives, 
perspectives, causal relationships, indicators 
of financial and non-financial performance, 
goals, strategic initiatives, matrix BSC, maps 
and stories BSC BSC (Kaufmann and 
Becker 2005). 
Kaplan (2009) argues that there are three 
development concepts of BSC: BSC for per-
formance measurement, to strategic objec-
tives and strategic maps, as well as for the 
strategic management system. First of all, 
BSC is only a complete measurement of fi-
nancial performance with operational meas-
ures such as customer, internal processes, 
and innovation and learning. Along with the 
implementation of the BSC, there exists a 
concept of strategic objectives as the basis 
for the selection of performance measures of 
the BSC and strategy map to illustrate how 
the company's strategy to achieve the strate-
gic goal to see a causal relationship between 
performance measures. 
Kaplan and Norton (1996b) argued that 
the main purpose of BSC is not a method of 
evaluation, but rather as a means of planning 
and communication strategies. After study-
ing the successful implementation of the 
BSC in several companies, Kaplan and Nor-
ton propose five management processes and 
leadership that determines the success of a 
strategy that makes the organization ek-
seskusi a "Strategy-Focused Organization" 
(Kaplan and Norton 2001). BSC implemen-
tation yielded mixed results. The positive 
impact of BSC implementation include: 
BSC can motivate managers to focus on 
non-financial dimensions (Ittner et al. 1997), 
positively related to organizational perform-
ance (Hoque and James 2000), change the 
orientation to the customer (Malina and selto 
2001), improve financial performance 
(Davis and Albright 2004), increased job 
satisfaction (Burney and Swanson 2010) and 
others. 
On the other hand Ittner, Larcker and 
Randall (2003) showed that the BSC adop-
tion is not correlated with sales growth and 
stock returns but even negatively correlated 
with the return on assets (ROA). Braam and 
Nijssen (2004) states that the use of the BSC 
will not automatically improve the perform-
ance of the company but it depends on how 
is implemented. Therefore, the use of BSC is 
aligned with the strategy can have a positive 
impact on performance. When it is not 
aligned it will probably have the opposite 
effect. 
The practice of BSC does not always go 
smoothly. Ittner and Larcker (1998) pre-
sented the results of the survey that the prob-
lem has often been encountered when im-
plementing BSC include the quantification 
of qualitative data, the need for sophisticated 
information systems, which included many 
measures, the difficulty in evaluating the 
significance of the relative size, difficulty in 
lowering the target (goal) to level (lower 
level) organizations, as well as the allocation 
of time and cost required. 
In this case, Malina and Selto (2001) 
adds some difficulties that negatively affect 
the BSC and cause conflicts between superi-
ors and subordinates, i.e. the size which is 
inaccurate or subjective, related to BSC 
communications such as one-way and 
benchmarks which are not appropriate in the 
evaluation. Ittner, Larcker and Meyer (2003) 
argue that the subjectivity in the assessment 
of the performance using the BSC allows 
superiors to act arbitrarily in assessing, for 
example, reducing the balance in bonuses, 
by giving greater weight on financial per-
formance measures, include factors outside 
the BSC in its judgment, changing the as-
sessment criteria from time to time, ignoring 
measures that have predictive power and 
weight on measures that have no predictive 
power. 
BSC has a limitation such as a lot of the 
attention of researchers is the cognitive limi-
tations of managers in performance evalua-
tions (Lipe and Salterio 2000). Through ex-
periments, it was found that in evaluating the 
performance using the BSC, managers tend 
to be affected by the common measures bias, 
the bias caused by reliance on the assess-
ment performance measures that are general 
rather than unique. Some researchers con-
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duct more research on the common measure 
bias and offers several approaches to reduce 
the bias (See for example; Libby et al. 2004; 
Roberts et al. 2004; Banker et al. 2004; Dilla 
and Steinbart 2005; Hibbets et al. 2006). 
In addition to the common measures 
bias, Tayler (2010) found that the implemen-
tation of the BSC could also allow for a bias 
due to "motivated reasoning". Kunda and 
Sinclair (1999) assert that the term "moti-
vated reasoning" is much discussed by social 
psychologists. This is associated with two 
major theories such as dissonance theory and 
attribution theory. One model of motivated 
reasoning explains that motivation affects 
judgment through cognitive processes. In 
turn, motivation can affect the selection of 
cognitive elements such as beliefs, concepts 
and rules of inference of the time of judg-
ment. For example, an individual will tend 
to choose and use the knowledge structure 
that supports the conclusion that he wants 
(Kunda and Sinclair 1999). 
Some studies in the field of accounting 
used the concept of motivated reasoning. 
Cuccia et al. (1995) and Cloyd and Spilker 
(1999) prove that the evaluation by tax pro-
fessionals in search of evidence and infor-
mation driven by the conclusions desired by 
their clients. Hackenbrack and Nelson 
(1996), Bazerman et al. (1997), Wilks 
(2002), and Kadous et al. (2003) describe 
the effect of the bias motivation of auditors 
in their judgment. 
Another study by Gilovich (1991) in 
Tayler (2010) found that "motivated reason-
ing" appears on the way evaluators look at 
the evidence. When he faces the evidence 
that does not comply with his wish he will 
tend to doubt that evidence and trying to find 
information to refute or question the validity 
of the unwanted evidence. Thus, the recep-
tion of information is limited by the data and 
it is in line with its reasoning (Kunda 1990). 
Again, the phenomenon of "motivated 
reasoning" can be explained by using attri-
bution theory. Attribution theory is a term 
for several models that examine the process 
of how a person in finding the cause (causal 
reasoning), that is how we look at why an 
event occurred (Fiske & Taylor 1991 and 
Jones in 1990 in De Villiers 2002). Attribu-
tion theory can explain how a person uses 
the information in its environment to create 
a relationship because of an outcome or 
event (Polyhart & Ryan Schroth & Shaw 
1997 and 2000 in a Cool and Teygen 2004). 
Some biases are as bias correspondence 
(correspondence bias), actor-observer bias 
(actor-observer bias) and bias self-
fulfillment (self-serving bias) are often dis-
cussed within the framework of this theory 
(Keren and Teygen 2004). 
For example, a correspondence bias is 
the tendency of people to draw conclusions 
about the nature of the person's behavior 
which on the whole can be explained by the 
situation of these behaviors (Gilbert and 
Malone 1995 in Wong-On-Wing et al. 
2007). Unlike correspondence, an actor-
observer bias is the tendency of actors when 
considering their actions which are deter-
mined by situational factors and trends by 
the observer attributing the same actions to 
the factor of character actors (Jones and 
Nisbett 1971 in Wong-On-Wing et al. 2007). 
Shields et al. (1981) in Birnberg et al. 
(2007) found that when individuals are as-
sumed as the boss, he tends to attribute more 
to the performance of subordinates as inter-
nal factors rather than external factors. On 
the contrary, the individual assumed to be 
subordinates tends to attribute their perform-
ance more as to external factors rather than 
internal factors. 
Next is self-fulfillment bias which is the 
tendency of an individual to attribute the 
success to him and attribute failure to factors 
outside its control (Elliot et al. 1998). Re-
search on attribution documented tendency 
satisfy themselves (self-serving) in a person 
by looking at themselves as the cause of a 
favorable outcome and put the responsibility 
for unfavorable outcomes to external factors 
such as luck or actions of others (Francis-
Gladney et al. 2009). 
The factor of strategy is an important 
factor that must be considered in the evalua-
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tion because it is so influential on perform-
ance. Wong-On-Wing et al. (2007) stated 
that the evaluation of the performance of 
business units using the BSC, managers tend 
to overlook the strategic factors as the cause 
of the poor performance of the business unit. 
In connection with this, Kaplan and Norton 
(1996a) suggested that the development of 
BSC should be done with the involvement of 
many parties such as upper-level managers, 
business unit managers, employees and oth-
ers. This will hopefully encourage them to 
pay attention and sense of belonging to the 
organization's performance. 2GC survey 
(2010) showed that the use of management 
involvement will greatly affect the value of 
BSC BSC. BSC rated very highly by the 
organization involving managers in the 
preparation (90 percent) and judged to be so 
high by organizations that do not involve 
managers in their preparation. 
In line with the above evidence, Niven 
(2005) says that the manifestation of one's 
commitment to the BSC is superior to its 
involvement in the drafting process of the 
BSC. 
However, research by Tayler (2010) 
showed a side effect of compilation en-
gagement BSC. A manager involved in the 
selection of strategic initiatives has motiva-
tion to consider these choices as his work. 
When they were asked to evaluate the stra-
tegic initiative in the BSC complex format, 
they tend to limit their cognitive effort to 
determine the effectiveness of the strategy 
and stuck her in motivated reasoning. There-
fore, it can be predicted that the managers 
involved in the selection of strategic initia-
tives will likely provide greater value to 
their strategic initiatives that will support the 
implementation of this strategy though its 
effectiveness is questionable. 
Another implication of the above study 
is that when the managers involved in the 
selection of strategies, their initiatives are 
required to assess the performance of the 
division managers that indicate failure to 
achieve the desired results then they will 
give a smaller value than the manager who 
was not involved in the selection of strategic 
initiatives. This is consistent with attribution 
theory which states that a person tends to 
attribute success to themselves and failure to 
external factors (division manager). From 
this, it can be hypothesized as the following. 
H1: Managers who are involved in the selec-
tion of strategic initiatives will be more 
likely to assess the strategic initiatives more 
successfully than those who are not in-
volved. 
H2: Under the condition indicating a failure 
to achieve the desired results, assessment of 
the performance of the subordinate and is 
given by superiors who are involved in the 
selection of strategic initiatives will be 
worse than superiors who are not involved in 
assessment. 
In this case, a causal relationship has 
been used in preparing the BSC. However, 
there are still problems when causality does 
not appear in the BSC report. BSC report as 
used in the study by Tayler (2010) and 
Wong-On-Wing et al. (2007) has failed to 
show clear evidence whether the company's 
strategy is effective or not. Therefore, it is 
assumed that it takes a more comprehensive 
feedback so that the user can read the BSC 
causal relationship between performance 
measures and strategic initiatives. 
Kaplan and Norton (1996a) provide 
some examples of feedback that can help 
managers in the strategic learning process 
correlation analysis, scenario analysis, anec-
dotal reporting, individual initiative review 
and peer review. This study uses correlation 
analysis. Kaplan and Norton (1996a) says 
that the correlation for inter measures of per-
formance will provide a strong confirmation 
of the effectiveness of strategies for manag-
ers of business units. However, according to 
a survey by Downing (2000) the respon-
dents, who had reported that BSC is 
equipped with a feedback strategic initiative 
is still small, figured to only 16 per cent. 
When a manager evaluates the perform-
ance of subordinates and the strategic initia-
tives by using the feedback form of strategic 
correlation analysis measures, it will be eas-
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ier to conclude the effectiveness of the or-
ganization's strategy. In amore details, cau-
sality will be able to reduce the complexity 
in the BSC report suspected to cause bias in 
evaluation. It is expected that when evaluat-
ing strategic initiatives as well as to the per-
formance of the division, the influence of 
motivated reasoning, biased observers and 
actors’ correspondence bias will be reduced. 
As such, it is hypothesized as the following. 
H3: In a condition there is a failure in 
achieving desired outcomes, subordinate 
performance appraisal given by the supervi-
sor who received feedback in the form of 
strategic initiatives, the correlation analysis 
would be better than that provided by the 
superior who does not get it. 
H4: In the condition there is a failure in 
achieving the desired results, the difference 
between the assessments of strategic initia-
tives manager involved in the selection of a 
strategic initiative to those who are not in-
volved will be smaller if the BSC report with 
feedback in the form of strategic initiatives 
measures of performance correlation analy-
sis. 
H5: In the condition there is a failure in 
achieving the desired results, differences in 
performance assessment conducted by a 
subordinate supervisor involved in the selec-
tion of a strategic initiative to those who are 
not involved will be smaller if the BSC re-
port feedback is equipped with strategic ini-
tiatives such as the correlation analysis be-
tween performance measures. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Design, Procedure, and Experimental 
Protocol 
To test research hypotheses, experiment was 
designed using 2 (involvements) × 2 (corre-
lation analyses) between subjects. Four cells 
are drawn in Figure 1. The division of par-
ticipants into four cells is done by random 
assignment. To make effectiveness of the 
desired manipulation, the researchers made a 
series of procedures to be performed by the 
participants. Experimental protocol was 
adopted from Tayler (2010). The pilot test 
was conducted with results showing that the 
case is quite easy to understand, realistic and 
easy to do. Experiment was done twice be-
cause the first experiments failed to check 
manipulation. The researchers did some cor-
rection on the experimental protocol to avoid 
failures that occurred earlier. 
 
Correlation Analysis 
All the participants began experimenting by 
reading and filling the experimental instruc-
tion and agreement form to participate in the 
experiment. Next, they listened to the direc-
tion of research in the form of record that 
contains general instructions of experimental 
implementation. As they read and filled out 
the instruction sheet and agreement form, 
large envelopes containing the experimental 
protocol were distributed. They were not 
allowed to open the envelope before in-
structed. The large envelopes containing 
several small envelopes were numbered in 
accordance with the design of the treatment 
or manipulation. Groups 1 and 3 only got 
four envelopes while groups 2 and 4 six en-
velopes. 
After getting direction, the participants 
were instructed to open the envelope and 
read the background of Case 1. In the back-
ground, information was explained to them 
that they portray a middle manager (middle 
manager) at PT. WIRABOGA, the company 
is engaged in the restaurant which has sev-
eral lines of business including pizzeria 
business restaurant. It was illustrated that the 
Figure 1 
Experimental Design 
 
Correlation Analysis  Present Not Present 
Low Group 1 Group 3 Involvement High Group 2 Group 4 
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participants served as department manager 
who oversees several divisions’ pizza that 
manages several pizza restaurants. Pizza 
restaurant owned by PT. WIRABOGA is 
named Pizza Lizza. 
They were informed that the president of 
PT. WIRABOGA were considering two al-
ternative strategies that will be implemented 
at Lizza Pizza restaurants to achieve its stra-
tegic objectives for giving satisfaction to the 
customer or "delight the customers". Two 
alternatives were being considered strategic 
initiative that is "Quality Materials Strategy" 
and "Buy 4 Get 1 Free Strategy". Each of the 
strategic initiatives indicates a different ap-
proach that is the approach of quality and 
quantity. Further, it was stated that the stra-
tegic initiatives pose no fixed costs, variable 
costs both strategic initiatives are relatively 
similar, and the company does not raise the 
price of the product linked to the implemen-
tation of the strategic initiatives. 
Further participants in the group with 
low involvement, i.e. groups 1 and 3, get the 
information that the president is the final 
decision to implement "Quality Materials 
Strategy". 
In the background of the case was noti-
fied that such strategic initiatives will be 
piloted first in Division A for a year to see 
the effectiveness of the strategic initiatives. 
After they read the background to the case, 
asked manipulation checks questions. After 
that participants could open next envelope. 
For groups 1 and 3 because the choices 
of strategic initiatives have been determined, 
they immediately opened the envelope 2. 
For groups 2 and 4, they were instructed to 
open one envelope that is between 2 and 3 in 
accordance with their previous choice of 
strategic initiatives. For participants who 
chose their strategic initiatives of Quality 
Ingredients 2 were requested to open the 
envelope while selecting strategic initiatives 
Buy 4 Get 1 Free were requested to open the 
envelope 3. However, they did not know the 
difference between the envelope 2 and 3. 
The researchers did not distinguish the 
envelope 2 and 3 but only the name of a stra-
tegic initiative that is in the experimental 
protocol tailored to the participants' choice 
of strategic initiatives. 
The protocol contained in the envelope 
was opened after the envelope 1 which con-
tains an introduction to the BSC adopted by 
Lizza Pizza in their management systems, 
information on the performance data of four-
teen Lizza Pizza restaurant which consists of 
seven restaurants that implement strategic 
initiatives selected and seven other restau-
rants which did not apply, and report the 
performance of strategic initiatives such as 
correlation analysis for groups 2 and 4. 
Introduction to the BSC were presented 
in the form of an explanation of the BSC 
which was framed as a series of causal rela-
tionships and their application to Lizza Pizza 
and an explanation of the performance 
measures used. In addition, it was also pre-
sented an image of how the causal relation-
ship between performance measures and 
strategic initiatives. Strategic initiatives were 
described as having a direct influence on 
Customer Value Survey and indirect effect 
on gross profit. This is to show how the stra-
tegic initiatives are expected to generate 
strategic objectives achieved. All can be 
found in Appendices 1. 
BSC report provides information on the 
performance of seven restaurant run by divi-
sions A and seven restaurants which have 
characteristics are similar to restaurants run 
by a division but do not implement strategic 
initiatives which are selected. Again, the 
strategic initiative was piloted in the A divi-
sion and stated that the results of the imple-
mentation of the strategy by strategy con-
sultants will be seen in the first year of im-
plementation. It is intended that no partici-
pants who perceive that the strategic initia-
tive in the first year can not be assessed ef-
fectiveness. 
Especially for groups 2 and 4, they re-
ceived a report that shows the strategic ini-
tiatives explicitly correlation coefficients 
between measures of performance with other 
performance measures and relevant strategic 
initiatives. An overview of the BSC report 
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and strategic feedback form correlation 
analysis to participants can be found in ap-
pendices 2 and 3. 
After reading the reports of the perform-
ance of the restaurants run by divisions A 
and restaurants comparison, the participants 
were given questions about their judgment 
on the performance. After answering these 
questions about their assessment of the suc-
cess and support of selected strategic initia-
tives to be implemented in the entire restau-
rant in the future, they were requested to 
open the next envelope. For groups 1 and 3, 
they were asked to open the envelope 3. As 
for groups 2 and 4, they were requested to 
open one of the envelopes 4 and 5 in accor-
dance with their strategy option chosen pre-
viously. The envelopes containing data as it 
existed BSC report on the previous envelope 
and asked to answer questions about their 
assessment of the performance division 
manager A. 
As in the previous stage, the participants 
were entered in group 3 and 4 received re-
ports of strategic initiatives such as correla-
tion analysis. When they finished answering 
the question that is on the envelopes 3 for 
groups 1 and 3, and 4 envelopes or envelopes 
5 for groups 2 and 4, they were instructed to 
open the envelope containing the final de-
briefing. In the last envelope participants 
were faced with some manipulation check 
questions, the factors thought to influence 
their assessment of the success of strategic 
initiatives and performance division manager 
as well as some demographic questions. At 
the end of the question, the researchers of-
fered to the participants to accept the results 
of research done and asked them to write an 
e-mail address for those who wanted it. 
After answering all questions, they were 
requested to include all small envelopes into 
a large envelope along with the instruction 
sheet and agreement form which would be 
kept by the researcher. Given the speed for 
different experimental tasks between the 
different participants with other participants, 
the researchers asked them not to leave the 
room until all of them finished. As expected, 
the time to complete the experimental task 
was for about 30 minutes. 
 
Participants 
This experiment involved 63 undergraduate 
students who were taking management ac-
counting I course. The researchers asked 
permission for using the time and place of 
the lecturers who taught them. The study 
was conducted after they finished the course. 
It was done in two times. First Time I was 
conducted on March 21, 2011 at 09.00 pm 
with 21 participants and Time II was held on 
1 April 2011 at 09.00 am with 42 partici-
pants. 
The reason choosing the above students 
was based on the following: 1) they were at 
this stage have learned a lot about the BSC 
and thus performance evaluation can be con-
sidered to assess their performance; 2) if 
using the real managers of the companies 
that have implemented the BSC, the result 
would be likely in bias. This bias arises be-
cause each manager has a BSC in each com-
pany so that the manager will consider the 
possibility of measurement based on the ex-
perience of their respective companies and 
are not based on a case design that has been 
built (Lipe and Salterio 2000), 3) the use of 
participant who have been trained well in 
advance will have a bias, because of the pos-
sibility of experimental results obtained not 
because of manipulation, but because of the 
impact of prior learning (Lipe and Salterio 
2000); 4) Clinton (1999) in Cheng et al. 
(2003) stated that previous studies in the 
accounting literature and research related to 
management judgment and decision-making, 
students justified as a replacement manager 
with a record of tasks are suitable for stu-
dents. Researchers consider that tasks in the 
experiment can be done by students for the 
task in this experiment does not require 
managerial experience. 
 
Size and Operational Variable  
The Participation in the selection of strategic 
initiatives and providing strategic feedback 
is manipulated as the independent variable. 
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Those who were in the selection of a strate-
gic initiative were partially manipulated by 
asking them, i.e. belonging to groups 2 and 
4, to choose one of the strategic initiatives 
that are being considered by the company. 
This was done before they got a report on 
the performance of the top 14. 
For the independent variables, it was 
asked whether or not the correlation analysis 
was in the report of the strategic initiatives. 
Most participants, i.e. belonging to groups 3 
and 4 got additional reports in the form of 
statistical analysis that show the effective-
ness of strategic initiatives. In this case, the 
performance reported in the BSC would be 
the same for all groups of participants except 
the correlation analysis results for most par-
ticipants. 
There are two dependent variables such 
as the value of the strategic initiatives and 
the value of the performance division man-
ager A. The variable value against divisional 
performance was measured by asking the 
participants to provide the value to the per-
formance of a division managers who im-
plement strategic initiatives with a scale of 0 
(very poor) and 100 (special). On the con-
trary, the value of the strategic initiatives is 
measured by asking the participants to de-
termine the level of their support for strate-
gic initiatives that have been implemented in 
the A division at all Lizza Pizza restaurants 
with a scale of 0 (no support at all) to 100 
(very supportive). 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Manipulation Checking 
The manipulation checking was conducted 
in three stages. The first stage is to see if the 
participants could follow the instructions 
given, the second stage is to see if partici-
pants could correctly answer questions about 
manipulation, and the third stage to see if 
there are differences in the average sense of 
responsibility for the performance of a divi-
sion between the groups involved in the se-
lection strategic initiatives and those that are 
not involved. In the first stage, there was one 
participant who opened the envelope which 
was not allowed to be opened. Therefore, the 
subsequent analysis of the data was issued. 
The second manipulation checking was 
done by testing the participants to determine 
whether the two statements were true or 
false. The first statement is that they act as a 
middle manager in charge of several divi-
sions. The second statement is that they are 
involved in the selection of a strategic initia-
tive that will be piloted in the restaurants run 
by division A. The analysis showed there 
were 12 participants who failed to correctly 
answer both questions. Thus, 63 people to-
tally in the initial number of participants, the 
remaining were 50 response analyses at a 
later stage. 
The third manipulation checking was 
done by comparing the average sense of re-
sponsibility for the performance of a divi-
sion between those who are involved in the 
selection of strategic initiatives and groups 
that are not involved. The result of t-test sta-
tistics indicates that there are significant dif-
ferences (t = 2.572, p = 0.013) between the 
average sense of responsibility for the per-
formance of a division in the groups that are 
involved in the selection of strategic initia-
tives (81.30 s.d. = 12.78) and in the group 
were excluded (67.22 s.d. = 24.88). 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Table 1 presents the number of participants, 
the average value and support to strategic 
initiatives as well as the average value for a 
division manager for each group along with 
the standard deviation. Hypothesis testing 
was done using MANOVA (Multivariate 
Analysis of Variance). Table 2 shows the 
test results of independent variables affect-
ing the dependent variable. 
The main effect of the variable involve-
ment on support of the strategic initiatives is 
not significant at the 0.05 level with a value 
of F = 3.795 with p = 0.058. Table 3 shows 
that the average support on strategic initia-
tives by groups with a low involvement is 
59.05 and involvement and the group with 
high involvement is 71.436. This shows that 
hypothesis 1 is not supported. 
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The main effect of the involvement on 
the assessment of the performance of the A 
division manager is also not significant with 
F value = 1.948 with p = 0.170 (Table 2). 
Table 4 shows that the average value of the 
performance by the group manager of divi-
sion A with low involvement is 60.570 and 
high involvement is 66.332. Thus, hypothe-
sis 2 is not either supported. 
The effect of duration of the experiment 
was controlled by entering it as a covariate. 
This can be seen in Table 2. At this table, it 
shows that the duration of the experiment 
did not have a significant effect both on the 
Support for Strategic Initiative (F = 0.002, p 
= 0.962) and Performance Manager value (F 
= 0.544, p = 0.465). As for the correlation 
analysis, the main effect of initiatives on 
support for the strategic initiative is signifi-
cant at the 0.05 level with a value of F = 
0.192 with p = 0.664 (Table 2). In Table 3, it 
can be seen that the average support on stra-
tegic initiatives by the group given the 
analysis of correlation of 66.606 and by a 
group that was not given is at 63.835. Yet, 
the main effect of the R Correlation Analysis 
for the performance appraisal division man-
ager value is significant with F = 4.866 with 
p = 0.033 (Table 2). 
In Table 4, it shows the average value of 
the division manager performance A by the 
group given the analysis of correlation is 
67.968 and by the group not given the analy-
sis of correlation is 58.933. This shows that 
hypothesis 3 is not supported. Hypothesis 3 
stated that the group given the correlation 
analysis will provide higher value than those 
who were not given. However, the analysis 
suggests otherwise, the group given the cor-
relation analysis provides a lower value for 
the performance of managers. 
Hypothesis 4 and 5 were tested by using 
the variables and interactions between vari-
ables based on Involvement Correlation 
Analysis. As in Table 2, it can be concluded 
that the effect of involvement and interaction 
variables Correlation Analysis on the Sup-
port for the Strategic Initiative is not signifi-
cant with a value of F = 2.118 and p = 0.152. 
Thus, hypothesis 4 is not supported. Table 2 
also shows that the effect of involvement 
and interaction variables Correlation Analy-
sis on the manager performance value is not 
significant with a value of F = 2.118 and p = 
0.152. Thus, hypothesis 5 is not either sup-
ported. 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION, AND LIMITATIONS 
Unlike the findings by Tayler (2010), this 
study did not receive empirical support that 
the involvement of managers in the selection 
of strategic initiatives provides higher sup-
port than those who are not involved. This 
may be caused by differences in the assumed 
role. In a previous study, Tayler (2010) as-
sumed the experimental subjects as manager 
of the restaurant while the subjects in this 
study are assumed to be middle managers in 
charge of the division managers, which in 
this case they manage the restaurants. This 
allows the difference in motivation between 
division managers and middle managers 
even though they were both involved in the 
selection of strategic initiatives. 
The possible implications of motivated 
reasoning will result in a higher valuation 
for the success of strategic initiatives accord-
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Group N 
Average Support 
towards Strategic 
Initiatives 
Support Std. 
Deviation towards 
Strategic Initiatives
Average Manager 
Performance 
Value 
Std. Deviation of 
Manager 
Performance Value
1 12 62.42 25.69 67.75 12.49 
2 13 70.77 17.95 67.92 10.37 
3 11 55.55 26.22 52.91 18.62 
4 14 72.14 18.06 65.14 15.06 
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ing to preference; also will lead to evaluat-
ing the performance of lower subordinates. 
In the second hypothesis, it is stated that the 
value of the performance division manager 
in circumstances indicate failure by manag-
ers involved in the selection of strategic ini-
tiatives and this is smaller than the managers 
who are not involved. This hypothesis does 
not get support at all this study. 
There might be some possible causes for 
the above phenomenon. First, the assump-
tion in the hypothesis is a condition that in-
dicates a failure. In the failure condition, the 
researchers argue in accordance with attribu-
tion theory that someone will be more likely 
to blame others rather than themselves. This 
hypothesis is impossible because the partici-
pants did not perceive this failure condition. 
The efforts for the researchers to reduce 
the influence of motivated reasoning in this 
research initiative is by providing a report 
that is expected to facilitate strategies for 
assessing the success of the individual with 
the right strategic initiatives. Difficulty to 
obtain appropriate conclusions on the suc-
cess of strategic initiatives will encourage 
someone to stop looking for more compre-
hensive information. With the correlation 
analysis, it can indicate the failure of strate-
gic initiatives to improve gross profit on the 
restaurants division A which is expected to 
increase the individual for performance ap-
praisal of division manager A. 
Failure is indicated in the BSC report on 
strategic initiatives outlined that shows the 
failure of the strategy so that they do not 
blame a division manager for the failure 
rather than the effectiveness of strategic ini-
tiatives. For that reason, the third hypothesis 
stated that the group given the correlation 
Table 2 
Tests of Between-Subject Effects 
 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Support for Strategic initiative 2179.473a 4 544.868 1.103 .367Corrected 
Model Manager performance value 1850.779b 4 462.695 2.237 .080
Support for Strategic initiative 17600.612 1 17600.612 35.615 .000Intercept 
Manager performance value 14369.771 1 14369.771 69.462 .000
Support for Strategic initiative 1875.679 1 1875.679 3.795 .058Involvement 
Manager performance value 403.001 1 403.001 1.948 .170
Support for Strategic initiative 94.708 1 94.708 .192 .664Correlation 
analysis Manager performance value 1006.570 1 1006.570 4.866 .033
 
Support for Strategic initiative
 
209.709 1
 
209.709 
 
.424 .518
Involvement* 
Correlation 
Analysis Manager performance value 438.244 1 438.244 2.118 .152
Support for Strategic initiative 1.139 1 1.139 .002 .962Experiment 
duration Manager performance value 112.575 1 112.575 .544 .465
Support for Strategic initiative 22238.527 45 494.189  Error 
Manager performance value 9309.221 45 206.872  
Support for Strategic initiative 240900.000 50   Total 
Manager performance value 214682.000 50   
Support for Strategic initiative 24418.000 49   Corrected Total 
Manager performance value 11160.000 49   
a. R Squared = .089 (Adjusted R Squared = .008)  
b. R Squared = .166 (Adjusted R Squared = .092)  
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analysis will provide value to the division 
manager A performance is higher than those 
who were not given. However, this hypothe-
sis is not either not supported. The analysis 
shows that the value of the division manager 
A performance is given by those who get the 
correlation analysis is smaller than that do 
not get it. 
There may be the cause of the failure for 
hypothesis 3 which is not supported. First, 
such a failure on the hypothesis 2 may be 
caused by the failure of participants to get 
signal of a failure. The results of the gross 
profit are smaller than comparable entries 
and smaller than the target does not make 
them see it as a failure because the value of 
excellent customer surveys. Friedman test 
showed that there is a difference in the 
weight given to participants the four BSC 
perspectives both in their assessment of the 
effectiveness of strategies (p <0.001) as well 
as the performance of the division manager 
A (p = 0.012) with the highest weight which 
is given to the customer perspective. 
The assumption of restaurants perform-
ance that is managed by the division is man-
aged in accordance with attribution theory. 
This would reduce the value of the role of 
the perpetrator. Attribution theory states that 
when being successful, a person will tend to 
attribute the success to him, but when it 
fails, someone will likely attribute it to ex-
ternal factors, in this case the division man-
ager. 
Second, additional data, such as correla-
tion analysis may fail to facilitate the deduc-
tion that is the effectiveness of the strategy. 
The addition of the report may actually add 
to the difficulties due to the information 
overload factor. Although they got reports of 
strategic initiatives such as correlation 
analysis, it is stated that the report is to assist 
them in determining the effectiveness of 
strategies (mean = 1.40; ds = 2.582; scale of 
-5 to 5), but they still have difficulty in judg-
ing to determine the effectiveness of the 
strategy (mean = 1.44; ds = 2.383; scale of -
5 to 5). There is no difference between the 
perception of the difficulties they got with 
the correlation analysis which they did not 
get it (t = 0.471, p = 0.640). 
By strategic initiatives, such as ineffec-
tiveness of the report on the correlation 
analysis and the effect of the interaction be-
tween the variables involved in the selection 
of strategic initiatives with correlation 
analysis can not be expected. Thus, the sup-
ported of the hypothesis 4 and 5 failures may 
also be caused by the factors that have been 
described previously. The analysis of corre-
lations between variables Strategic Initia-
tives support the weight given participants in 
assessing the effectiveness of strategies in 
each BSC perspective, the financial perspec-
tive, customer, internal business process and 
learning and growth. All these can not be 
found any significant correlation. Likewise, 
correlation analysis between variables of the 
value of manager performance with weights 
is on the four BSC perspectives. 
Some limitations are such as the partici-
pants using S-1 (undergraduate) students 
who are less experienced in assessing per-
formance and strategic initiatives for divi-
sion manager only by using the BSC. Al-
though all participants had followed the 
course of management accounting and statis-
tics and 90 percent had learned about the 
BSC, they have not yet knowledgeable with 
their understanding of the BSC. BSC put a 
financial perspective as the bottom line of 
the company's strategy. The effectiveness of 
Table 3 
Mean Values and Mean Difference Support for Strategic Initiatives 
 
Variable Mean Mean Difference Sig. 
Low 59.005 -12.431 0.058 Involvement 
High 71.436 12.431 0.058 
No 66.606 2.771 0.664 Correlation analysis 
Yes= 63.835 -2.771 0.664 
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a strategy should be seen whether it can af-
fect the results (outcomes). Some attempts to 
provide an understanding of the BSC in the 
experimental protocol may be less effective. 
This might be better if before doing the ex-
periment, the participants get training in ad-
vance as done by Dilla and Steinbart (2005). 
Again, in this study, the participants 
acted as if they were middle managers, not 
like the one on Tayler (2010). The position 
as middle managers who are not directly 
responsible for the performance of the res-
taurant may lead to different levels of moti-
vated reasoning to the manager who is di-
rectly responsible when they are involved in 
the selection of strategic initiatives. The 
middle manager position is a position that 
will judge and be judged on the performance 
of these restaurants. Department manager in 
this case is the supervisor for the division 
manager but also subordinate to the presi-
dent. 
The case study here is very complex so 
it will probably cause information overload. 
The number of participants who did not pass 
the manipulation check showed it. In addi-
tion, the complexity of the case as presenting 
the data manually so that this is more diffi-
cult task for the participants in the experi-
ment. The results might have been different 
if the experimental protocol is presented in a 
computer. 
Last but not least is that this study uses 
only one order of assessment, the partici-
pants gave an assessment of the effective-
ness of strategic initiatives first and then as-
sess the performance of the division man-
ager A. There might be a difference between 
those who rate assessment of strategic initia-
tives earlier than performance appraisal of 
division manager with the opposite order. 
Therefore, future studies could investigate 
this matter. 
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APPENDICES 1 
INTRODUCTION TO BSC 
 
BSC (Balanced Scorecard) 
Every resturatnt of Pizza Lizza is measured on its performance using BSC. BSC shows that 
success of strategy is not only dependent on financial performance but also other perspec-
tives. Usually, BSC consists of four perspectives such as financial, customer, internal proc-
ess, and learning and growth. Besides for measuring company performance, company also 
uses BSC to focus on improvement on the areas of such as aspects important in success of 
company strategy by using strategic initiatives. 
 
Causal Effect 
Strategy can be viewed as group of hypotheses on causal effects between outcomes intended 
with causes attempted by the company (driver). The exits causal effect is due to the interrela-
tionship between outcomes intended with the causes attempted by the company (driver) 
which shows the effectiveness of such strategy, so as on the other way around. BSC reflects 
step by step of the order of causal effect initiated by the aspect of the causes (driver) up to the 
aspect of outcome. Good learning and growth is expected increase internal process. This 
good internal process is also expected to increase customer satisfaction. In return, customer 
satisfaction is expected to increase the financial performance. Please look at the figure ex-
pressing hypothesis of causal effect among the dimensions of BSC in Pizza Lizza, among 
performance measures and strategic initiative which will be implemented. 
 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
Financial Perspective 
- Gross profit 
Strategic Initiative 
- Quality strategy  
- Materials 
Internal Process 
Perspective  
- On-time Deliveries 
Perspective of 
Learning and Growth 
- Staff retention 
Customer Perspective 
- Customer survey value 
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APPENDICES 2 
BSC REPORT  
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